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  Chapter III 
CRITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON “LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT” 
I.  HOW WAS “LAW AND DEVELOPMENT” RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
DISCUSSED IN INDONESIAN CONTEXT? 
As I have discussed at a glance in Chapter I, there are, at least, three concepts 
about how developing countries such as Indonesia accomplish their “legal 
development”. It is true that the first two concepts—one that has been suggested by 
David M. Trubek, and the other by Robert B. Seidman—have been being commonly 
adopted in discussing “Law and Development,” while the third concept, Donald Black’s 
concept, is not yet ordinarily discussed when we talk about “Law and Development.” 
However, in my opinion, Donald Black’s concept is necessary to discuss as the third 
after those of David M. Trubek and Robert B. Seidman. 
The contention between David Trubek’s concept and that of Robert B. 
Seidman has been expressed by Robert B. Seidman himself (1978: 29) that: 
 
“There are two common notions about how to change the 
legal order. One argues that good law in one place is good law 
anyplace else. It advises the lawmaker to copy the legal order of 
developed countries in order to achieve development. The other 
advises that laws make little difference in people’s behaviour. Good 
men, not good laws, make good government. These notions dominated 
colonial thinking about law. They persisted in modern Africa. As a 
result either (1) laws were mechanically copied from other contexts, 
and did not work; or (2) governments did little to change inherited 
legal order, but instead ‘explained’ poverty by the ‘innate character’ of 
the poor…” 
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 Robert B. Seidman terms his concept “The Law of non-transferability of 
Law”. I quote at a sufficiently length Seidman’s description about his concept for us to 
understand thoroughly his own argumentation when he proposed the concept. 
Seidman (1978:34) begins his explanation about his concept of “The Law of 
Non-Transferability of Law” by citing R.S.Jordan and J.P. Renninger (1975) who write 
that:  
“Legal transplants practically never work. Attaturk introduced 
the French Civil Code into Turkey: Turkey does not resemble France. 
Anglophonic Africa, despite the reception of English law, did not 
develop, as did England. Why this nearly universal failure of 
transferred law to induce behaviour in its new home similar to that 
which it induced in its original site?” 
 
Furthermore, Seidman (1978:34-35) writes that: 
 
“The anthropologist Fredrik Barth has suggested that ‘The 
most simple and general model (of man in society) is one of an 
aggregate of people exercising choice while influenced by certain 
constraints and incentives…Our central problem becomes what are the 
constraints and incentives that canalize choice.’ Patterns of social 
form—i.e. of the repetitive actions of people—can be explained 
through the assumption that they are ‘generated through processes of 
interaction and in their form reflect the constraints and incentives 
under which people act.” 
 
In his further explanation, Seidman (1978:35) cites M. Tushnet that: 
 
“Law affects the choices of individuals in two ways. In the 
first place, each actor perceives the commands of the law as 
constraints or incentives which he must take into account, either 
because he believes that it is right and proper that he obey them or, 
like Holmes’s ‘bad man’, he obeys the law only because of its threats. 
To each actor, ‘the law appears as a factor which affects his decisions 
but over which he has no control.” 
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Furthermore, Seidman (1978:35) explicates that: 
 
“The law also affects the choices of individuals indirectly. 
We make our choices about what to do in the light of the repetitive 
patterns of behaviour of others—i.e. the institutions of the society. I 
drive on the left hand side of the road not merely because the law 
commands me to do so, but because I know that others will drive on 
the left, and therefore I drive there for my own safety. Just as much of 
my own behaviour is in part a function of the law’s commands to me, 
so is the institutionalized behaviour of others, that so powerfully 
affects my own behaviour, in part a function of the law’s commands to 
them.” 
 
According to Seidman (1978:35): 
 
“Most of the constrains and resources within which 
individuals choose, however, are of course not a function of the law. 
Custom, geography, history, technology and a host of other non-legal 
factors affect my behaviour directly and indirectly by structuring the 
choice and thus channelling the behaviour of others. These other, non-
legal constraints and resources are the reason for the failure of legal 
transplants. It is as though two hikers were making their way through 
different forests, each with thickly set underbrush, rocks, swamps, 
streams, lakes and ravines, and also glades of soft grass, flat places 
with easy walking, and frequently a well-defined path. The course that 
each takes through the woods results from his constantly choosing the 
easiest way to go. Where a forester transports some of the trees from 
one forest into the other, the path taken by the hiker in that forest 
might change somewhat, even radically, to avoid the new trees. It 
could never, however, resemble the path in that other forest from 
which the trees were transplanted. The rocks, swamps, streams, and 
other determinants of the hikers’ routes are too different.” 
 
 93
 Finally, Seidman ( 1978:35-36) states that: 
 
“So with the transplantation of law. In acting, individuals take 
some account of the constraints and incentives offered by the law. 
They also take into account a host of non-legal factors. A particular 
law in two places with different social, political, economic and other 
circumstances can therefore only by coincidence induce similar 
behaviour in both places. English law failed to recreate in Africa 
anything resembling English society and the English economy because 
of the vast difference between all the other, non-legal institutions of 
England and of Africa. English law’s principal economic institution 
was contract. Contract law assumes that each actor seeks his 
individual advantage. Nineteenth-century English society as a whole 
embodied such constraints and resources that its entrepreneurs made 
choices that produced history’s most rapid economic development. In 
Africa, British entrepreneurs faced quite different institutions, posing a 
different set of constraints and rewards. When England was 
undergoing development, the local English market offered the greatest 
rewards for the entrepreneur. When Africa was being developed, 
England, not the local, African market, offered the greatest rewards. 
The export-oriented, dual economies of tropical Africa resulted from 
English entrepreneurs seizing the advantage.” 
 
Seidman (1978:36) makes the summary of “The Law of Non-Transferability of 
Law” as follows: 
 
1. Laws are addressed to addressees (here called ‘role-occupants’), 
prescribing their behaviour. 
2. How a role-occupant acts in response to rules of law is a function not 
only of their prescriptions but also of his physical environment and of 
the complex of social, political, economic and other institutions within 
which he makes his choices about how to behave. 
3. The physical and institutional environments of different sets of role-
occupants differ from time to time and place to place. 
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 4. Therefore, the activity induced by rules of law is usually specific to 
time and place. 
5. Therefore, the same rules of law and their sanctions in different times 
and places, with different physical and institutional environments will 
not induce the same bhaviour in role-occupants in different times and 
places. 
 
Beside the two “grand theories” that are extremely contradictory and 
commonly adopted by the literature discussing the issue of “law and development” as I 
have mentioned in Chapter I, there are still two other concepts about how law functions 
in the development of developing countries like Indonesia, namely Donald Black’s 
delegalization theory and the concept of “Indonesian Traditional Customary Law” 
proposed by Indonesian experts who take forward the use of Indonesian traditional law 
in accomplishing legal development and legal reform. 
In case of “Law and Development” in Indonesia, in my opinion, the four 
concepts need to be combined proportionally. Despite my description at a glimpse in 
Chapter I, what I mean here may be briefly stated as follows: 
 
a. David M. Trubek’s concept that suggests developing countries wanting 
to accomplish legal development and legal reform to directly transfer 
advanced countries’s laws, in my opinion, may be applied to certain 
legal fields with more universal and global nuances. For example, if 
Indonesia wants to generate legal provisions in the field of “cyber law”, 
given the universal nuance of “cyber law”, it is no mistake for us, for 
the sake of efficiency, to directly transfer the provisions of “cyber law” 
from such advanced countries as USA. 
b. Robert B. Seidman’s concept of “The Law on Non-transferrability of 
Law”, may be also applied when we have to be more selectively 
distinguish which institutions, principles, and regulations of foreign law 
are in agreement with the living values and the needs of Indonesian 
society and those that are not. Suitable legal institutions, principles as 
well as regulations may be directly transferred into Indonesian legal 
system; in contrast, those considered to be in disagreement should be 
refused, or, at least, should be revised and adapted to the needs and 
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 values of Indonesian law. 
c. The “delegalization” concept proposed by Donald Black, is also 
sufficiently effective to be adopted into the fields of law with business 
nuances, in which it is felt that the procedures of litigation are not 
advantageous from business point of view. Accordingly, alternative 
dispute resolution (henceforth is abbreviated as ADR) such as 
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration, that are no other than forms of 
delegalization, are sufficiently proper to apply. About these ADR, I will 
discuss in more details in Chapter V. 
d. Principles and rules of “Indonesia Traditional Customary Law” may be 
still used also in the fields of family law such as marital and divorce 
law. 
II.  CAN LAW BECOME THE VITAL MEANS TO ACHIEVE DEVELOPMENT 
IN INDONESIA? 
This sub-chapter will discuss the questions: “ Can law become the vital means 
to achieve development in Indonesia?” and “What does development mean in Indonesia 
concept or sociological values?” 
To answer both questions mentioned above, we must, at first, determine: What 
we mean by “law” here? 
For the purpose of the discussion about “Law and Development”, I want to use 
Wortley’s definition of law (see, Achmad Ali 1996:41): 
 
“Law is the collective term for the rules of conduct for men 
living in a legal order… An effective system of law is one where the 
rules are likely to be followed.” 
 
I want to emphasize the element of “an effective system of law is one where 
the rules are likely to be followed.” With this emphasis I want to refuse those who 
identify law as merely in form of “written law”; indeed, law is broader, encompassing 
written law, unwritten law, and judicial decisions. Therefore, when we discuss “law and 
development,” what we mean is all law mentioned above. Even more, what we mean by 
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 legal development was the development of the substance, structure, and culture of law 
(borrowing Lawrence M. Friedman). 
For law become the vital means to achieve development in Indonesia, decision-
makers of Indonesian legal development should thoroughly understand that the present 
condition of Indonesia is different from that of advanced countries when they initiated 
their legal development in the past. In the following, I can present a number of 
examples showing that problems and demands of legal development in every country 
are so varied that it is impossible for us to apply a uniform style. For law to become the 
vital means to achieve development, then, the relationships among law and society must 
be carefully studied in order to understand their consequences for law and development 
in their society. In order to develop knowledge about law and development, we must 
first recognize that there are different ways in which we can ask and answer questions 
about how law and development are related to one another.  
For example, popular movements and shifting relations of political and 
economy power are sweeping away past divisions and conflicts. As has been suggested 
by Flacks (1988), the Cold War order that shaped the control and use of material 
resources, political and economic organization, and ways of thinking from the end of 
World War II in 1945 has collapsed. In its wake, the world today is going through 
epoch-making changes. In Europe, in the countries of the former Soviet Union, in South 
Africa, Latin America, and China, a variety of demands and struggles for constitutional 
democracy; a richer material life; national autonomy; social institutions such as trade 
unions, professional associations, universities, churches and political parties that are 
independent of the state are shaping history. These struggles are bearing fruit in the 
form of political freedom and individual liberty in the everyday lives of people. At the 
same time, a host of problems are surfacing; economic hardships, class and gender 
conflicts, and the opening of historic ethnic and national animosities. The handshake of 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and Yaser Araft, Chairman of the Palestine 
Lberation Organization, symbolizes hopeful change: the hatred and bloodshed among 
the peoples in the former Yugoslavia reveals the human capacity for aggression and 
brutality (Gerald Turkel, 1996:3). 
Central to these changes are renewed attempts to use law in forming just, 
democratic, and economically vibrant societies that value diversity among individuals 
and groups and that recognize the importance to human survival of relationships among 
social and economic processes and the natural world. In Central Europe, the concern 
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 with law that limits the power of the state and that establishes political equality has been 
ushered in by people like former President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic, who 
spent years in prison because of his opposition to the Communist state. In the former 
Soviet Union, efforts to establish legal states to replace the Communist Party state have 
been largely successful. Basic to this vision is the effort to create a legal system that is 
independent from political parties and bureaucratic sources of power. In China, efforts 
to modernize and decentralize the economy have led to emergence of legal institutions 
such as courts and the legal profession to deal with conflicts over contracts and property. 
This, in turn, has opened up wider conflicts over democratizing political institutions. In 
South Africa, Nelson Mandela, the former leader of the African National Congress and 
the first elected black president, has been dismantling racism through a combination of 
political action, economic pressure, and negotiation with former President Botha and the 
National Party. This is being done, in part, by establishing constitutional grounds to 
equal rights for all citizens under a regime of law. In Latin America, popularly elected 
governments have emerged that promise to limit the power of wealthy oligarchies and 
the military over society and to resolve conflicts through law and legal institutions. 
(Gerald Turkel, 1996:3-4). 
The specific condition of Indonesia is clearly different from the above-
mentioned examples. President Suharto was “overthrown” (di “lengser”kan), leaving 
this country with very bad economic, social, and political conditions, including legal 
condition. Habibie who replaced Suharto’s position also failed to satisfy peoples’ 
expectations; even during his 18-month tenure in power, the legal condition and law 
enforcement in Indonesia increasingly deteriorated. 
Next, Duet Gus Dur-Megawati stepped up to the national leadership stage of 
Indonesia as a result of an Election (Pemilu). However, the ascension of the Duet did 
not really led to a genuinely new government, because there were still many figures of 
Suharto’s regime participating, even assuming top position, for example Akbar Tanjung, 
who presently still serves as the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 
Republic of Indonesia, and Marzuki Darusman, who presently serves as the Attorney 
General.  
Therefore, following Kritz’s terms (1995:66), Indonesia is in the condition of a 
“transplacement” government – a government whose elements were combination of 
new figures with a high commitment to democracy and figures of the previous regime, 
who, of course, have difficulties to change their old paradigm, that has been frozen 
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 within their personalities, without mentioning their tendency to conceal their defective 
past “track records”. Conflicts between political elites go on, despite the increasingly 
worse life of common peoples. 
Too positivistic thinking that, among others, conspicuously emphasizes the 
“procedure” in law enforcement, added with corruptive mental of law enforcement 
figures, has produced judicial decisions the results of which disappoint peoples, 
especially those relating to “kelas kakap” (big-time) corruption cases. The result is, 
the increasingly worse image of law enforcers in the eyes of peoples, and in turn, 
leading to the lost of peoples’ confidence in legal institutions as well as other formal 
institutions that eventually, results in the tendency for some of Indonesian peoples to 
practice “tindakan main hakim sendiri” (to exercise unlawful actions toward 
someone else guilty of something, or “eignrichting”). Riots occur everywhere. All of 
these inevitably also put impacts on Indonesia’s economy. The Rupiah has been always 
dropped to become weak. The crisis of confidence does not only occur among the 
members of Indonesian society, it is also felt by other countries. 
In my opinion, to initiate Indonesian legal development, and to give law a role 
in Indonesian development, the first thing to do is how to restore the confidence of 
Indonesian peoples in Government and law enforces. And the way is, first, that 
something should be done to cleanse the dirty-broom figures who are still roaming 
about in law enforcement institutions and state institutions. One of these efforts has 
been carried out, namely the entry of 27 Justices into the setting of the Supreme Court 
of Indonesia. However, the same endeavour is not yet performed within the body of the 
Office of Attorney General, despite the fact that, in my opinion, the Office of Attorney 
General of the Republic of Indonesia constitutes the “spearhead” of the KKN 
(Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism) eradication in Indonesia. 
It is only after the accomplishment of the above mentioned efforts that, in my 
opinion, we can think about; how to create legislation that are in agreement with values 
living within Indonesian society, because it is laws in agreement with the intrinsic 
values of society that will be obeyed meticulously by the people. 
We should not forget that legal awareness, legal obedience, and legal 
effectiveness constituted three interrelated legal elements. Frequently, people mix up 
confusingly between “legal awareness” and “legal obedience”, despite the fact that, in 
my opinion, both elements are not precisely the same, although closely interrelated. It is 
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 true that both elements mostly determine whether the implementation of law and 
legislation in society is effective or not. 
Krabbe (Paul Scholten, 1954:166) provides an explanation about legal 
awareness: 
“Met den term rechtsbewustzijn meent men dan niet het 
rechtsoordeel over eenig concreet geval, doch het in ieder mensch 
levend bewustzijn van wat recht is of behoort tezijn, een bepaalde 
categorie van ons geestesleven, waardoor wij met onmiddelijke 
evidentie los van positieve instellingen scheiding maken tusschen 
recht en onrecht, gelijk we dat doen en onwaar, goed en kwaad, 
schoon en leelijk. ” 
 
Thus, according to Krabbe, legal awareness is actually the awareness or values 
within the self of the human being about the existing law or law that is expected to exist. 
In my own opinion, Krabbe’s definition above has sufficiently explained about 
what legal awareness to be. This definition should be more perfect with the addition of 
the “societal values” element about what functions should be performed by law in the 
society, as expressed by Paul Scholten (1954:168-169): 
 
“De term rechtsbewustzijn is dubbelzinnig. Hij duidt ten 
eerste categorie van het individuele geestesleven aan, doch dient 
tegelijk om het gemeenschappelijke in oordelen in een bepaalden 
kring aan te ijzen…Wat we ‘rechtsbewustzijn’ noemen is in dit 
verbandt niet anders dan een min of meer vage voorstelling omtrent 
wat recht behoort te zijn.” 
 
Thus, legal awareness possessed by members of society is not a guarantee that 
the community will obey a rule of law or legislation. One’s awareness that stealing is 
“wrong” or “criminal” does not necessarily lead the person not to steal; when a demand 
forces him—for example, if he does not steal his only severely ill beloved child should 
die—he should do the crime for having no funds for the medical treatment. 
 
I my self distinguish legal awareness as follows: 
a. virtuous legal awareness. 
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 b. Evil legal awareness. 
 
One example of evil legal awareness is a person who with his increasingly 
broader knowledge of law knows the possibility to make use of appeal and cassation, 
despite his consciousness that he stands behind the wrong party. This evil legal 
awareness, in my opinion, constitutes one of the causes of increasingly over-
accumulated cases in the docket of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Legal obedience itself may still be differentiated in its quality into three types, 
as have been suggested by H.C.Kelman (1966:140-148): 
a. Obedience of compliance nature, namly when a person obeys a rule or 
norms because he is afraid of the sanction. 
b. Obedience of identification nature, namely when a person obeys a rule 
or norms because he is afraid that otherwise his relationships with 
someone may be broken. 
c. Obedience of internalization nature, namly, when a person obeys a 
rule or norms because he truly feels that the rule is in agreement with 
inrinsic values he adheres. 
 
When is a rule or legislation deemed to be ineffective? The answer is, of course, 
when the majority of the community members do not obey it. However, suppose that 
the majority of the community members appear to observe the rule or legislation, the 
effectiveness magnitude or quality of the rule or legislation is still questionable. 
In other word, after knowing the three types of obedience, we can no more 
merely use the magnitude of obedience to a rule or legislation as the parameter of its 
effectiveness; on the contrary, at least there should exist differences of effectiveness 
quality of a rule or legislation. The more members of society who obey a rule or 
legislation in merely compliance or identification manners indicate merely low 
effectiveness of the rule or legislation; on the contrary, the more members of society 
obey a rule or legislation in an internalization manner, the higher the quality of 
effectiveness of the rule or legislation. 
So, the question “Can law become the vital means to achieve development in 
Indonesia?” may be answered “Yes” if the majority of society members, if the majority 
of development implementers, already obey law in internalization quality. 
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 In my opinion, the meaning of the current development is identical with 
modernization, so that the meaning of legal development is modernization in the field 
of law that, in the concrete form, means to develop the obedience level of community 
members to reach the level of internalization. 
It is necessary to note that, a modern legal structure does not only depend on 
legislation and efficient and effective legal bureaux, but most of all on a modern judicial 
system and also on the participation of all members of society. Especially in Indonesian 
case, beside the weaknesses in the field of legislation, something that has been mostly 
highlighted by society is the poor performance of the courts. A modern judicial system 
will ensure that the courts will conduct and facilitate a speedy adjudication of disputes 
for those who litigate in the courts. Therefore, I am in support of the opinion that, in the 
process of development and modernization of the legal structure in Indonesia, 
developing the judicial system into a modern system should be the apex of that 
development. 
Once again, modernization and development of law in Indonesia should begin 
with a thorough “political will” of Government for that. Modernization of the total legal 
structure in Indonesia will depend among others on the legal professional who are 
manning the system and the political will of the government to give priority to the 
development of law. 
Law should be functioned optimally. An illustration of the optimized functions 
of law may be seen, among others, in the functions of law suggested by Charles 
Sampford (1989:110-111): 
 
1. ‘Dispute resolution’ – a function of courts and law firms. 
2. ‘Reinforcement’ or ‘reinstitutionalization’ (Bohannan,1968) of existing 
practices within the community by framing rules that equate to those 
practices and by providing the means for their ‘facilitation’ 
(Summers,1977 : 127)- a function of courts and legislatures. 
3. ‘Change in existing practices’ (Schur,1968 : 75)- by legislatures 
and,sometimes,courts. 
4. ‘Guidance’ or ‘education’ (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971:9)- again, by 
the legislature and courts. 
5. ‘Regulation’ , the administrative control of various private institutions-
by the bureaucracy. 
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 6. ‘Participation by the state in social and economic affairs’ by the 
bureaucracy. 
7. ‘Punishment’ , retribution or vengeance against perceived wrong-doers, 
reinforcement of existing social values—by courts and penal 
institutions. 
8. ‘Maintaining social peace’ (or, more loosely, ‘social order’ or ‘social 
control’) –by police and penal institutions to the extent that they isolate 
some and deter some other potentially violent individuals. 
9. ‘Legitimation’ of existing social institution—supposedly achieved by 
courts. 
 
Another meaning of legal development is highlighted through sociological 
optics, namely, that socialization and communication of law and legislation should be 
optimized. 
Prior to the discussion of a draft (RUU) in the House of People’s 
Representatives, especially when the will-be rule is in form of an Act, it should be, in 
the first instance, socialized within society members, so that the will-be-born Act (UU) 
is not contradictory to the “values living in society”. In the same manner, after being 
discussed over deeply in the House of People’s Representative, before its enactment, 
once again, the draft (RUU) should be socialized so that it will thoroughly absorb the 
aspirations of society at large. Hastiness in producing any Act should be avoided, 
because an Act that is given birth in haste will be only of the quality of “sweep 
legislation”, borrowing Gunnar Myrdal’s term. 
There are three prerequisites for a rule of law or legislation to be observed by 
society members: 
a. The members of society should know the existence of the rule of law; 
b. The mmbers of society should know the content of the rule of law; 
c. The members of society should percept the advantage and satisfaction 
from their obedience to the rule of law. 
 
Therefore, or the existence and the content of a rule of law to be known by 
society members, a socialization process is necessary when the rule of law is effective, 
because socialization of any rule of law should aim to: 
a. How to make society members know the presence of legislation or 
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 regulations. 
b. How to make society members know the content of legislation or 
regulations. 
c. How to make society members able of channeling their aspirations to be 
contained within the content of legislation. 
d. How to make society members able of adapting themselves (their frame 
of thinking and behavior ) to the goal legislation wants. 
III.  THE “LAW AND JUSTICE” IN INDONESIA 
I regret that most books discussing “Law and Development” do not at all 
mention the discussion about the “justice” factor in its relation to development, despite 
the fact that, in my opinion, injustice development constitutes merely development with 
fragile foundations, such as one performed by President Suharto with his concept of 
“REPELITA” (the Five-Year Development Plant) that ended with the fall out of 
Indonesian economy and the “step-down” of Suharto from the peak of power in 
Indonesia. Indeed, the issue of justice was always echoed by Suharto and ministers as 
ell officials of his regime; however, the issue just constituted a logan, despite the reality 
that everywhere injustice practices went on in the course of development carried out by 
Suharto’s regime. 
To initiate discussion about the justice factor in its relation to “law and 
development” in Indonesia, I will, firstly, put forward several definitions of justice 
commonly used in the literature of law. 
A.  DEFINITIONS OF JUSTICE 
To determine what is “just” and what is “unjust” is not an easy matter. It is true 
of what has been expressed by L.B. Curzon (1979:37): 
 
“Can justice be defined? The difficulties inherent in the 
definition of concepts such as ‘law’…they apply equally to the 
definition of ‘justice’. Additionally, there is the difficulty presented by 
jurists who stress the fact that those norms employed as standards of 
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 justice may vary from one individual to another so that they are often 
impossible to reconcile; indeed, they may be no more than emotively 
expressed ideals without descriptive meaning. 
 (a) “Only relative values are accessible to human reason; 
and that means that the judgment to the effect that 
something is just cannot be made with the claim of 
excluding the possibility of a contrary judgment of value. 
Absolute justice is an irrational ideal or, what amounts to 
the same, an illusion”: Kelsen . 
 (b)  “To invoke justice is the same thing as banging on the 
table;an emotional expression which turns one’s 
demands into an absolute postulate”:Ross. 
 
Next, L.B. Curzon (1979:37-38) quotes some definitions/descriptions from the 
literature of jurisprudence. The following are of interest： 
 
(a) “Justice is a political virtue, by the rules of it the state is regulated and 
these rules are the criterion of what is right”: Aristotle. 
(b) “The virtue which results in each person receiving his due”: 
Justinian. 
(c) “The idea of justice supposes two things: a rule of conduct and 
sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed 
common to all mankind and intended for their good; the 
sentimen is a desire that punishment may be uffered by those 
who infringe the rule”: Mill. 
(d) “Justice has always weighted the scales solely in favour of the 
weak and the persecuted. A just decision is a decision based on 
grounds which appeal to a disinterested person”: Ehrlich. 
(e) “Who or whatever renders to every man his due,that person or 
thing is just; an attitude, an institution, a law, a relationship,in 
which every man is given his due is just”: Brunner. 
(f) “Justice requires that freedom, equality and security be 
accorded to human beings to the greatest extent consistent with 
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 the common good”: Bodenheimer. 
(g) “Justice is the correct application of a law, as opposed to 
arbitrariness”:Ross. 
(h) “Justice among men involves an impartial and fearless act of 
choosing a solution for a dispute within a legal order,having 
regard to the human rights which that order protects”: Wortley. 
B.  TYPES OF JUSTICE AND LEGAL REFORM IN INDONESIA 
Irrespective of debates over definitions of justice, various literatures also 
distinguishes types of justice, one of which is suggested by Aristotle (Curzon,1979:38): 
 
“(a) Distributive Justice is concerned essentially with the allocation of 
rights, duties and burdens among the members of a community so 
that equilibrium is ensured. It involves the equal treatment of those 
equal before the law. 
(b) Corrective,or remedial, justice corrects any disequilibrium in the 
community by restoring whatever equality existed before a wrong 
was committed”. 
 
For the purpose of the discussion about “law and development” in Indonesia, I 
myself will distinguish three types of justice as the following: 
a. Procedural Justice. 
b. Substantial Justice. 
c. Transitional Justice. 
 
Procedural Justice is justice resulting from a formal legal process, that does 
not necessarily fit the “sense of justice” of the society at large, for example when a 
defendant of a corruption case is decided free by the judge not because he has not, in 
fact, committed the crime, but merely because he has bribed the judge. The acquittal 
decision by the judges for the defendant is, from the optics of “procedural justice”, 
considered to be just; however, from the optics of “substantial justice,”  the decision 
of acquittal is considered to be contradictory to the sense of justice. Thus, what means 
by substantial justice is the essential justice that is not confined to the formal 
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 procedure solely. In the above-mentioned example, it is substantial justice if the 
defendant is sentenced severely.  
To be more clearly, substantial justice, according to Majid Khadduri 
(1999:201) is: 
 
“an internal aspect of some law; and the justice elements 
contained in some law constitute a declaration of “truth” and “wrongs”. 
In Islamic vocabularies, the “truth” and the “wrong” are called, 
respectively, ‘halal’ and ‘haram’ (al-halal wa al-haram) and constitute 
some general and specific rules…” 
 
I will discuss Transitional Justice in specific in Chapter IV, New Paradigm of 
Law and Development in Indonesia. 
The biggest mistake of the New Order government’s (Suharto’s regime) 
policies was the over-reliance on procedural justice, and, in the same time, the long 
practices, more than thirty two years, of “nepotism”, in which the economy was 
monopolized by the Cendana Family (Suharto, his children and his grandchildren) hand 
in hand with giant conglomerates of Suharto’s cronies such as Liem Siao Liong, Bob 
Hasan, Abdul Latief and so on. Justice in form of even distribution of economic welfare 
being desired by peoples at large did never come. 
Peoples were removed from their lands on the reason of “for the sake of 
common interests” that, although with compensation, the worth provided to them did 
not match the value of their lands. Under the New Order, land was appropriated for 
large-scale development, often after bloody clashes with landholders, while long-
running disputes over compensation and rights of occupancy went unresolved, in some 
cases for decades. The seriousness of injustices in land problems in Indonesia during 
Suharto’s era was accurately stated, in late 1995 Indonesia’s respected English language 
daily, the Jakarta Post (4 November 1995) observed in an editorial that ‘the land 
problem in this country could become a social time bomb if it is not handled with care.’ 
The above-mentioned prediction had come true in reality. Anton Lucas and 
Carol Warren (in Chris Manning & Peter van Diermen, ed, 2000: 220-221) write that: 
 
“Since Suharto’s demise, these unresolved agrarian tensions 
have exploded in many areas as part of widespread demonstrations 
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 and public confrontations with officials, in scenes unthinkable during 
the Suharto era. Farmers opened irrigation channels to gain more 
access to irrigation water in Aceh (Kompas, 8 December 1998), and 
attacked and burned the property of a landlord in Riau (Republika, 7 
December 1998). They pulled up sugar cane on disputed land in East 
Java, occupied oil palm plantations, and harvested coffee and other 
crops belonging to state-owned plantations. Plantations as well as land 
acquired for as yet unrealised developments have been reoccupied 
across the country and planted with food crops such as maize and corn. 
Farmers have also occupied, surveyed and redistributed disputed land 
in North Sumatra, Bali, Lombok, and other regions, including part of 
Suharto’s ranch at Tapos in West Java, although not without resistance 
from local authorities. While many of these actions are, in part, 
responses to the economic crisis as it became a food crisis in many 
communities, protests about corruption, unfair compensation 
payments for land compulsorily acquired and the role of the military in 
land acquisition (Surya, 21-23 September 1998; Jawa Pos, 24 
September 1998) are expressions of longstanding unrest over 
unresolved agrarian disputes throughout the country.” 
 
Furthermore, Anton Lucas and Carol Warren ( 2000:223-225) explain clearly 
land dispute cases in Indonesia. Partly because the policy reforms recommended in the 
above two policy documents were never implemented—because of potential conflict 
with the vested interests of power holders—land disputes comprised the largest number 
of cases dealt with by the newly established National Human Rights Commission 
(Komnas HAM) and Administrative Courts by the 1990s (see Table 4). Between July 
1994 and September 1996, Komnas HAM (1997) recorded 891 incidents of human 
rights abuses involving land expropriation, collated from report in 28 regional 
newspapers. The national postal complaints system recorded 590 land complaints in 
1997, two and a half times as many as the year before (Business News, 2 January 1998). 
The National Land Agency (BPN) recorded 1.395 complaints submitted in writing or in 
person for the six-month period to the end of 1998 (BPN 1999a, 1999b). 
Annually published Human Rights Commission data on land cases handled 
since its establishment in 1994 are also indicative of escalating incidents, or at least of 
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 their visibility, and of the popular resistance that contributed to the collapse of the 
Suharto regime. In 1994 the Commission dealt with 101 complaints involving land 
issues. This rose steadily to reach 351 in 1997, a three-fold increase over the final four 
years of the New Order (See, Table 4 below). 
 
Table 4 : Land Cases Submitted to the Jakarta Administrative Court and 
National Human Rights Commission 
 
 
    1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
    
 
Jakarta Court 
No.          37     53     35     30     40     56     55     40 
(%)     (22.3) (25.6) (22.4) (19.0) (23.4) (29.3) (33.7) (30.8) 
Total (all cases)      166   207   156   158   171   191   163    130 
 
Human Rights Commission 
No.         -     -     -   101   178   327   351   339 
(%)         -     -     - (17.7) (20.5) (23.3) (32.1) (27.8) 
Total (all cases)       -     -     -   572   867 1.406 1.093 1.221 
 
 
* These statistics represent new cases submitted to the Jakarta branch of the Administrative Court only 
and do not include cases carried over from previous years, which typically represent half the annual 
case load. There are 24 categories of human rights cases, of which land (pertanahan) represented 
the largest number in all but two years (1991 and 1994), when housing and civil service cases 
outstripped it. 
**  These figures represent completed cases dealing with land issues out of total completed cases for he 
six categories reported :land, labour, official abuses, housing, religion and other (Komnas HAM 
1996:8; 1997:29; 1998:38). Approximately 30 percent of complaints submitted were unresolved and 
carried over to the following year’s case load. 
(Source: Anton Lucas and Carol Warren, 2000:224). 
 
According to Anton Lucas and Carol Warren (2000:224-225): 
 
“In Indonesia’s economic crisis (YLBHI 1998:8), of the 553 
cases its Land and Environment Division dealt with in the year that 
brought the demise of the New Order, 26 per cent concerned land 
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 conflicts arising from the establishment of large-scale plantations, 23 
per cent land clearance for industrial, residential and tourist projects, 
and 13 per cent forest, mining and aquaculture developments (YLBHI 
1998:1-4). The remaining ‘non-structural’ cases included the issuance 
of false land certificates, road expansion and misappropriation by 
government officials. The disputes dealt with by the Legal Aid 
Foundation in 1998 alone involved a total of 827.000 hectares of land, 
and affected the livelihood of more than a million people (see, Table 5 
below).” 
 
Table 5: Land Cases Handled by the Legal Aid Foundation for  
14 Provinces, 1998 
 
Province     Cases    Land Area    Households 
(no.)       (ha)    Affected 
                (no.) 
1. West Java       28      3.422       2.887 
2. DKI Jakarta     116         637         844 
3. Central Java       23      1.083       1.241 
4. DI Yogyakarta         4      1.057         572 
5. East Java       60      1.050      5.632 
Subtotal 
No.       231      7.249     11.176 
(%)     (41.8)        (0.9)         (5.2) 
 
6. DI Aceh          7     59.985       4.254 
7. North Sumatra       42   113.050     53.727 
8. West Sumatra       12     15.483       1.612 
9. South Sumatra     135   195.585      26.284 
10. Lampung       73   253.122      98.846 
11. Bali          9          285          684 
12. South Sulawesi      12     13.110       2.382 
13. North Sulawesi      15      32.285        6.593 
14. Irian Jaya       17   137.197        8.798 
Subtotal 
No.       322   820.102    203.180 
(%)     (58.2)      (99.1)      (94.8) 
 
Total       553    827.351    214.356 
(100)        (100)        (100) 
 
 
 
The Legal Aid Foundation report (YLBHI 1998) provides what little 
information is available on the regional distribution of land conflicts. It reveals that in 
1998, 58 per cent of the 553 cases it dealt with across 14 of Indonesia’s then 27 
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 provinces were located outside Java. However, more than 99 per cent of the total land 
area and 95 per cent of the total households affected were in these Outer Island 
provinces (See, Table 5). 
Due to injustices perceived by the peoples under Suharto regime, criticisms 
against injustices in the agrarian field were glittering during the reform era. Among the 
most spectacular signals of the dramatic nature of political change during the last 
months of the Suharto regime, and the transitional interregnum, were the direct actions 
of aggrieved local groups. These included purging officials accused of corruption and 
collusion with the Suharto regime, and reasserting claims to and reoccupying lands lost 
to the mega-projects of the late New Order. Almost immediately after Suharto’s fall 
from grace, the occupation of the Suharto ranch at Tapos near Bogor and the Cibodas 
golf course by displaced farmers captured national media attention. The farmers of 
Cibodas, part of the rapidly developing resort area of Puncak Pass and a playground of 
Jakarta’s new rich, had been forcibly removed from their land with compensation of 
only a few cents per square metre a decade earlier. On resuming control of part of their 
former lands, they engraved tanah rakyat (people’s land) into the fairway, asserting 
‘the people’s claims to a greater stake in the post-New Order scheme of things (see, 
Anton Lucas & Carol Warren (2000:227-228). 
Therefore, we can conclude that justice required in legal development and 
reform in Indonesia is not merely procedural justice, but also substantive justice. And, 
especially in the present transitional era, “transitional justice” should be implemented, 
as I will discuss it in Chapter IV. 
Injustice development carried out by a regime always ends with the collapse of 
the regime. Aristotle has ever said that: 
 
“ Man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but when 
separated from the law and justice, he is the worst of all.” 
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